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Progress toward deregulation of the airlines and the elimination
of many silly job safety regulations have created the notion that
government regulation is entering a declining phase in the United
States. The facts, however, support the reverse view. The pace of
regulation of business is continuing on an upward trajectory. The
number of agencies, regulatory programs, and authorizing statutesand the budgets to carry them out-are all continuing to grow.
Moreover, a very substantial further expansion of regulation is
in the government pipeline. Many of the laws passed in recent years
are in the early growth stages of development. As the U.S. Council
on Environmental Quality pointed out in its recent annual report
(1978), current estimates of the burden of regulation "do not yet
include many costs associated with the hazardous waste section of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976, and 1977 Amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the 1977 Amendments to
the Clear Air Act." For most of this legislation, the Council pointed
out that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is still in the
process of developing its final regulations, the effects of which will
not be felt until business and government begin to implement them. 1
Similar patterns prevail in other areas. The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) has recently promulgated a
generic carcinogenic standard which, when implemented, is likely to
generate compliance costs greater than the total existing array of
OSHA standards. 2 The National Highway Traffic Safety
Mr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University in St. Louis. An earlier version of this report was prepared for the
Key Issues Lecture Series at New York University, October 1979.

Administration is pursuing mileage goals at a pace which will test the
outer limits of the survival capacity of the relatively few American
companies that still produce motor vehicles. 3 In light of these
expansions of regulatory activity, surely some perspective is useful.

phenomenon. Let us try to do so by focusing on the resources that
are required to carry out these efforts. That measurement should
provide an upper limit to the amount of savings that could result
from regulatory reform.

THE NEW WAVE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
It is hard to overestimate the current rapid expansion of
government involvement in business in the United States. Certainly
the majority of public policy changes affecting business-government
relations in recent years has been in the direction of greater
governmental intervention -environmental controls, job safety
inspections, equal employment opportunity enforcement, consumer
product safety regulations, energy restrictions, and so forth. Indeed,
when we attempt to look at the emerging business-government
relationship from the business executive's viewpoint, we see a very
considerable public presence in what historically have been private
affairs.
No one who operates a business today, neither the head of a
large company nor the corner grocer, can do so without considering
a multitude of government restrictions and regulations. His or her
costs and profits can be affected as much by a bill passed in
Washington as by an executive action in the front office or a
customer's decision at the checkout counter. Management decisions
fundamental to the business enterprise are increasingly subject to
governmental influence, review or control.
In fact, the term "regulated industry" has become archaic.
Every industry in the United States is feeling the rising power of
government regulation in each major aspect of its day-to-day
operations. If we could accurately measure the pervasiveness of
government intervention, we would not find the economists'
favorites-electric utilities and railroads-at the top of the list. More
likely, we would encounter such giants of the manufacturing sector
as automobile, aerospace, and chemical companies, with the oil
industry and health services not too far behind.
Because of the rapid proliferation of government regulatory
activity in recent years, it should be useful to attempt to measure this

THE COSTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
The costs that result from government regulation of business can
be analyzed by grouping them into three categories:
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1. The cost of administering the regulatory agencies: This is the
smallest portion and the easiest to measure. The data are also useful
indicators of changing trends and relationships in the entire
regulatory network.
2. The indirect cost of compliance by the private sector: This element
is much larger and more difficult to measure. However, as we will
see, there is a substantial literature on individual programs which can
be drawn upon to develop useful aggregate estimates.
3. The induced effects of regulation: This is the most diffuse and
elusive aspect of measuring the impacts of regulation. Yet there are
important indicators which show that regulation has extremely
substantial, long-term effects on innovation, capital formation, and
the structure of industry.
The Direct Costs of Regulation
The expansion of regulation in the United States can be seen
most readily in the steady increase in the number of major regulatory
agencies established by the Congress-from fourteen prior to 1930,
to a little over two dozen in 1950, to a present total of 57. As shown
in Figure 1, the most rapid expansion occurred not in the New Deal
period of the 1930s, but rather during the 1970s. 4
The initial and direct effects of government regulation can be
measured by the budgets of the regulatory agencies themselves, which
are presented in Table 1. The figure includes such government
administrative costs as salaries of inspectors, office supplies, and the
government's own paperwork flow. These are the expenses of
writing, managing, publishing, and policing regulations. 5 The great
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TABLE 1
Expenditures on Federal Regulatory Activities
(Fiscal Years, Millions of Dollars)
1970

Area of Regulation

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1979

1978

%of
(Estimated) % Change
1981
1980 19811970 to 1979 Budget

Social Regulation
Consumer Safety
and Health ............... $ 392 $ 593 $ 948 $1059 $1251 $1347 $1464 $1772 $2261 $2474 $2606 $2857
+531%
Job Safety and Other
742
104
124
310
379
447
492
544
642
800
+935%
227
Working Conditions .......
62
85
146
493
585
759
967 1026 1047 1296 1517 1688 2217 + 1685%
Environment and Energy ....
843

1565

1871

2320

2693

2937

3311

4101

4633

5036

5874

+760%

85%

106

123

134

142

158

186

211

240

273

296

294

352

+ 179%

5%

125
96

151
105

166
120

140
133

203
153

220
169

251
199

286
225

297
245

318
271

377
316

384
327

+ 154%
+ 182%

5%
5%

327

379

420

415

514

575

661

751

815

885

987

1063

+ 171%

15%

$ 866 $1222 $1985 $2286 $2834 $3268 $3598 $4062. $4916 $5518 $6023 $6937

+537%

100%

Economic Regulation
Finance and Banking ........
Industry-Specific
Regulation ...............
General Business ............
Total Economic
Regulation ...............
Grand Total.................

12%
32%

539

Total Social Regulation ......

.J:>..

41%

10%
13% 21%
12%
9%
15%
41%
62%
15% 24%
15%
Annual Nominal Increase ....
5.1% 4.1% 5.8% 9.7% 9.6% 5.3% 5.5% 7.3% 8.9% 8.9% 8.8%
Annual GNP Deflator ........
1
GNP Deflator lndex • • • • • • • • •
100 105.1 109.4 115.7 127.0 139.2 146.5 154.6 165.9 180.7 196.7 214.0
Total in 1970$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 866 $1163 $1814 $1976 $2231 $2348 $2456 $2627 $2963 $3054 $3062 $3242
5%
7%
13%
34%
56%
3%
0%
6%
9%
13%
5%
Annual Real % Increase ......

NOTE:

1

GNP Deflator figures for years 1971-1977 are taken from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978. Figures for 1978-1981
are taken from the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1981.

Source: Center for the Study of American Business
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These governmental outlays indicate the costs of regulation
which are borne by the taxpayer. Estimates for the fiscal year 1980
show a total of $6.0 billion in federal expenditures to operate the 57
agencies which regulate business. That dollar figure represents nearly
a six-fold increase from the 1970 level of $866 million. There has
been, and continues to be, a steady growth in the pace of regulatory
activities. In fact, budget estimates for the regulatory agencies for
fiscal 1981 show an increase of nearly $1 billion, to a total of $6.9
billion in administrative costs-a 15 percent increase over 1980
figures.
In short, the cost of operating federal regulatory agencies is
rising more rapidly than the federal budget as a whole, the
population of the country, or the gross national product. The costs
to the taxpayer are obviously not trivial, but the key effects of
government regulation must be seen in terms of the compliance by
the private sector.
The Indirect Cost of Regulation
At first blush, government imposition of socially desirable
requirements on business through the regulatory process appears to
be an inexpensive way of achieving national objectives. This practice
apparently costs the government little-about one percent of the
federal budget. But the public does not escape paying the cost. Every
time, for example, that the EPA imposes a more costly (albeit less
polluting) method of production on any firm, the cost of the firm's
product to the consumer will tend to rise. Similar effects flow from
other regulatory efforts, including those involving product safety, job
health, and hiring and promotion policies.
These higher prices represent the ''hidden tax'' of regulation
that is shifted from the government to the consumer. Moreover, to
the extent that government-mandated requirements impose similar
costs on all price categories of a given product (such as passenger
automobiles), this hidden tax tends to be more regressive than the
income tax or sales taxes. Of course, it is not inevitable that every
regulatory activity will increase inflationary pressures. Where
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regulation generates social benefits (such as a healthier and thus more
productive work force) in excess of the social costs it imposes,
inflationary pressures should be reduced.
At times the impact of regulation on the prices that consumers
pay is direct and visible. The federal government has required the
producers of automobiles to incorporate in their product a wide
array of specified safety and environmental features. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics each year estimates the added price of the typical
passenger automobile resulting from the safety and ecological
features which were incorporated that year in response to federal
requirements. In Table 2, these items are summed and put on a
consistent price basis. Through 1978, the cumulative cost increase per
vehicle of these mandated features came to $666, or $7 billion for the
vehicles sold that year.
Numerous other costs in the private sector result from the
activities of regulatory agencies. In a few cases-notably EPA and
OSHA -comprehensive annual surveys of the cost of compliance are
available. An annual survey by the McGraw-Hill Department of
Economics reports the capital outlays that are made to meet OSHA
standards; its current estimates are in the neighborhood of $3.5
billion a year.
The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) projects
each year the incremental capital and operating costs that arise from
environmental regulation. As can be seen in Table 3, the annual cost
of incremental pollution abatement expenditures was $26.9 billion in
1978, consisting of $14.0 billion of current costs and $12.9 billion for
amortization of capital costs. CEQ estimates that these costs will rise
to $64.0 billion in 1987 (measured in constant 1978 dollars) and that,
over the decade, approximately $478 billion will be spent to comply
with federal environmental legislation, above and beyond those
substantial outlays that would have been made in the absence of such
legislation.
Another very substantial direct cost is borne by business firms
that must fill out the never-ending flow of questionnaires and other
forms issued by the regulatory agencies. The Federal Paperwork
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TABLE 2

-NV"'OO
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Government Mandated Equipment

--

N

-

1.0 00 00 00
\OMNM

Estimated
Current
Cost

V"'OOMNO'IV'l-.::tOMoONNNNO~oO

$ 47.84

1968

Seat and shoulder belts, standards for
exhaust emissions

1968-69

Windshield defrosting systems, door
latches, etc.

14.53

1969

Head restraints

27.48

1970

Reflective devices and further
emission standards

14.77

1968-70

Ignition locking and buzzing systems, etc.

12.75

1971

Fuel evaporative systems

28.33

1972

Improved exhaust emissions and warranty
changes; seat belt warning system

42.37

1972-73

Exterior protection

95.29

1973

Reduced flammability materials, etc.

1969-73

Improved side door strength

1974

Interlock system and improved
exhaust emissions

133.50

1975

146.66

1976

Additional safety features and
catalytic converter
Hydraulic brakes, improved bumpers, etc.,
(less savings from removal of
interlock system)

1977

Leak resistant fuel system, etc.

21.25

1978

Redesign of emissions controls

9.99

-

1.01.0-.::tN
~oo~o\
V"'NN-

00
N

-r-

00

0

0

V)

-

8.72
20.85

41.54

Source: Center for the Study of American Business
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Commission estimated that this paperwork burden costs businesses
from $25 to $32 billion each year. 6
For many of the older regulatory agencies-such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB)-independent scholars have estimated the costs for all
or a portion of the regulations. Usually, each estimate has covered
a different time period. The Center for the Study of American
Business at Washington University culled from the literature what
were considered to be the best estimates, usually taking the lower end
if a range was offered, and put the results on a consistent price basis.
Industry-specific regulations (such as those of the ICC, CAB, etc.)
figure prominently, in part because of the wealth of data available on
them. For many of the newer regulatory agencies, however, such as
the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Department of
Energy, reasonable compliance costs have not been developed, and
thus implicitly they were carried at zero, except for the paperwork
burden. This procedure yields both a major underestimate and a
clear opportunity for further research. The resulting estimate of the
compliance costs came to $63 billion in 1976 (see Table 4).

Consumer Safety and Health
Job Safety and Working Conditions
Energy and the Environment
Financial Regulation
Industry Specific
Paperwork
TOTAL

Compliance
Cost

Total

$1,516
483
612
104
484

$ 5,094
4,015
7,760
1,118
19,919
25,000
$62,906

$ 6,610
4,498
8,372
1,222
20,403
25,000
$66,105

$3,199

(a) Included in other categories
Source: Center for the Study of American Business
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(estimated)
1977

Administrative
Cost

(a)

TABLE 5
Estimated Cost of Federal Regulation of Business
(Fiscal years, in billions of dollars)

TABLE 4
Annual Cost of Federal Regulation
By Area, Calendar 1976
(millions of dollars)
Area

t

These estimated compliance costs were approximately twenty times
larger than the budgets of the agencies issuing the regulations. 7
Thus, on the average, each dollar that Congress appropriates for
regulation results in an additional $20 of costs imposed on the
private sector of the economy. In a more recent report prepared for
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, I attempted to
prepare a rough update of these figures by using the multiplier of 20
to 1 that was obtained in the base period and applying it to the
budget data for more recent years. The results showed the continued
upward movement in the costs resulting from federal regulation of
business. 8 Using that approach, the estimated aggregate cost of
issuing and complying with federal regulations comes to about $126
billion in the fiscal year 1980, or over $500 for each man, woman,
and child in the United States (see Table 5).

1978

1979

1980

Administrative Costs

$ 4.1

$

4.9

$ 5.5

$ 6.0

Compliance Costs

$82.0

$ 98.0

110.0

120.0

TOTAL

$86.1

$102.9

$115.5

$126.0

Source: Center for the Study of American Business
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The Induced Effects of Regulation
Some of the most powerful effects that flow from the exercise of
the government's rule-making power are even more difficult to
quantify. Those induced impacts of regulation include the following:
The innovative product research and development that is not
performed because corporate research and development budgets
increasingly are being devoted to what is termed udefensive
research." A number of individual companies report that they devote
large and growing shares of their scientific resources to meeting
regulatory requirements or to avoiding violations of regulatory
restrictions. For example, one hidden cost of government regulation
is a reduced rate of introduction of new products. The longer it takes
for a new product to be approved by a government agency-or the
more costly the approval process-the less likely that the new
product will be created. In any event, innovation will be delayed.
The impacts are most conspicuous in the pharmaceutical area and are
likewise becoming onerous in the chemical products sector, particularly as the toxic substance control regulations are promulgated.
The new investments in plant and equipment that are not made
because the funds must be diverted to meeting government-mandated
social requirements. The resultant loss of productivity has been
measured for environmental and job safety by Edward Denison of
the Department of Commerce at about one fourth of the potential
average annual increase in productivity. 9
Capital formation and productivity are also adversely affected
by the uncertainty about the future of regulations governing the
introduction of new processes and products. An example is furnished
in the report of a task force of the U.S. Energy Resources Council
which dealt with the possibility of developing a new synthetic fuel
industry. In considering the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, the task force stated that the major uncertainty was not
whether a project would be allowed to proceed, but rather the length
of time it would be delayed pending the issuance of an environmental
impact statement that would stand up in court. In assessing the
overall impact of government regulatory activity on the establishment
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of a new energy industry, the task force concluded, ''In summary,
some of these requirements could easily hold up or permanently
postpone any attempt to build and operate a synthetic fuels plant.'' 10
The recent cancellation of the SOHIO pipeline project (in 1979)
provides evidence that the regulatory uncertainties are not limited in
their adverse impacts to new (coal degasification) or even
controversial (nuclear) technologies.
The workers that are not hired because federal regulations have
priced them out of labor markets. One increase in the statutory
minimum wage reduced teenage employment in the United States by
over 200,000 below what it otherwise would have been. 11 In
construction labor, where unemployment rates are substantially
above the national average, government regulation also has acted to
price some segments of the work force out of competitive labor
markets. Under the Davis-Bacon Act, "prevailing" wages are paid
on federal and federally supported construction projects. These
government-mandated wage rates are often higher than those that
actually prevail in the labor market where the work is done. 12

The concentration of industry that results as smaller enterprises
find that the burdens of government regulation fall on them
disproportionately hard. Most of this impact is unintentional, in that
the regulations typically do not distinguish among companies of
different sizes. But forcing a small firm to fill out the same
specialized forms-or to develop a new type of equipment-as a
large company with highly-trained technical staffs places a
significantly greater burden on that smaller enterprise. This general
point is supported by data and examples for such different
governmental regulatory activities as the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the
National Labor Relations Board, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the Securities Exchange Commission. 13
The immeasurable effects of government regulation on the basic
entrepreneurial nature of the private enterprise system. To the extent
that management's attention is diverted from traditional product
development, production, and marketing concerns to meeting
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governmentally imposed social requirements, a significant
bureaucratization of corporate activity results.
In employee pension fund management, for example, pension
regulation has shifted much of the concern of fund managers from
maximizing the return on the contributions to a more cautious
approach of minimizing the likelihood that the managers will be
criticized for their investment decisions. It thus has become
safer-although not necessarily more desirable for the employees
covered-for the pension managers to keep more detailed records of
their deliberations, to hire more outside experts (so that the
responsibility can be diluted), and to avoid innovative investments.
In short, federal regulatory activity is resulting in a significant
bureaucratization of business activity. The ultimate costs of excessive
government involvement in the economy are not always visible but
surely are powerful-the factories that are not built, the jobs that are
not created, the goods and services that are not produced, and the
incomes that are not generated. These effects have formidable impact
on our standard of living and our quality of life.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMIC THINKING
It must be recognized that impetus for most of the expansion in

government power over business is not being provided by the
industries being regulated. Generally, businesses have shown a
minimum of enthusiasm for EPA, OSHA, ERISA, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), etc. If anything, the
companies claim that the "benefits" to them of these regulations are
negative. The pressures for the new style of regulation come, rather,
from a variety of citizen groups concerned primarily with noneconomic aspects of our national life-environmentalists, consumer
groups, labor unions, and civil rights organizations. Professor Barry
Weingast of Washington University has been developing a more
comprehensive theory of the relationships among the regulators and
the regulated, an approach that tries to take account of the changing
balance among public and private interest groups. 14
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To talk or write about the regulated industry ''capturing'' its
regulators is, to put it kindly, a rather quaint way of viewing the
fundamental shift in business decision making now taking place: the
shift of power from private managers to public officials. Yet, the
core of the economists' version of the "capture" theory still
holds-public policy tends to be dominated by the organized and
compact pressure groups which attain their benefits at the expense of
the more diffused and larger body of consumers. 15 But the nature of
those interest groups has changed in recent years. Rather than the
railroad baron (a relatively easy target for attack), the villain of the
piece has become a self-styled representative of "the public interest,"
who has succeeded so frequently in identifying his or her personal
prejudices with the national well-being. The business firm, in
contrast, performing its traditional middleman function, more
typically serves the unappreciated and involuntary role of proxy for
the overall consumer interest.
It is not a question of begrudging a "few" more billion dollars
for job safety, consumer health, etc. The truth is that the typical
regulatory program is not reaching the worthy objectives it was
established to attain. For instance, take the job safety program:
despite the array of regulations, inspections, and proceedings-and,
of course, the billions pf dollars devoted each year to meeting the
federal safety standards-we see no improvement in the statistics on
days lost due to job health and safety hazards.
But that is no isolated example. Surely the railroad passenger_that vanishing breed of consumer-does not benefit from the mass
of regulation maintained over rail companies by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Unfortunately, these are typical and not
unusual cases. Virtually every study of regulatory experienceranging from trucking to pharmaceuticals to pensions-indicates
both needless expense and ineffective operations or, worse yet,
counterproductive results.
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APPROACHES TO REGULATORY REFORM
Economists are prone to take measurements of economic
phenomena. The numbers, of course, are not an end in themselves,
but an input to decision makers. The measurement of the costs and
related impacts that flow from government regulation is no esoteric
matter. This information can be used in many ways. First of all, the
cost data show the public and the government the economic
importance that regulation has assumed, especially as measured by
the large dollar amounts of resources that are required in order to
meet federal mandates.
Second, this information helps to shift the public dialogue onto
new and higher ground. The pertinent policy questions are no longer,
"Are you for or against clean air or safe products?" or other such
absolutes. Increasingly, the public discussions are formed in terms of
less emotional and long-neglected questions such as, "How well is
the regulatory process working?" and, "Are there better ways of
achieving the public's desires?"
Finally, the availability of information on the costs of regulation
is an important step in reforming the regulatory process. The
pressure of the cost data inevitably leads to proposals for benefit/
cost analyses, cost-effectiveness studies, risk-benefit evaluations, and
similar analytical approaches to what in the past had been viewed too
often as emotional issues. Hopefully, legislation reforming regulatory
practices will mandate such analytical techniques and thus improve
the cost-and benefit-data that are used in the regulatory process.
A new way of looking at the microeconomic effects of
regulatory programs is needed. A parallel can be drawn to
macroeconomic matters, where important and conflicting objectives
are recognized and attempts at trade-offs are made (for example, as
between economic growth and price stability). At the microeconomic
level, it is likewise appropriate to reconcile the goals of specific
government programs with national objectives. Environmental
protection, product safety, and other regulatory efforts should be
related to costs to the consumer, availability of new products, and
employment. In part, this reconciliation can be made at the initial
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stages of the government process, when the president proposes and
the Congress enacts a new regulatory program.
Benefit -Cost Analysis

One device for broadening the horizons of government
policymakers and administrators is the economic impact statement.
Policymakers could be required to consider the costs (and other
adverse effects) of their actions as well as the benefits. This is not a
novel idea. In November 1974, then-President Gerald Ford instructed
the federal agencies under his jurisdiction to examine the effects of
major regulatory actions on costs, productivity, employment, and
other economic factors. President Carter has continued this effort,
with some modifications.
This first step is subject to several shortcomings. Many of the
key regulatory agencies-ranging from the Consumer Product Safety
Commission to the Federal Trade Commission-are so-called
"independent agencies," which are beyond the president's
jurisdiction in these matters. Even in the case of the regulatory
activities that come within presidential oversight, the agencies covered
by the Executive Order are required only to examine the economic
aspects of their actions; the weight they give to economic factors
remains at their discretion-to the extent that Congressional statutes
permit them to give any consideration to economic influences at all.
A broader approach is needed, one with a strong legislative
mandate. In the fashion of the environmental impact statements (but
without as much of the trivia), Congress should require each
regulatory agency to assess the impact of its proposed actions on the
society as a whole, and particularly on the economy. Much would
depend on the ''teeth'' put into any required economic impact
statement. Merely legislating the performance of some economic
analysis by an unsympathetic regulator would serve little purpose
beyond delaying the regulatory process and making it more costly.
But limiting government regulation to those instances where the total
benefits to society exceed the costs would be a major departure from
current practice.
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Government regulation should be carried to the point where the
incremental costs equal the incremental benefits, and no further.
Indeed, this is the basic criterion that is generally used to screen
government investments in physical resources. Overregulation is not
an emotional term. It is the economist's shorthand for regulation for
which the costs exceed the benefits.
The critics of the analytical approach to evaluate government
regulation tend to forget that benefit/ cost analysis is a neutral
concept. It gives as much weight to a dollar of benefits as to a dollar
of costs. And, in a broader sense, the estimation of benefits and
costs need not be necessarily viewed in dollar terms. The costs as well
as the benefits may at times properly be measured in terms of human
life. For example, OSHA regulations may have a very high
opportunity cost when they divert professional safety staffs of the
companies from their traditional duty of training workers in safer
procedures. The "benefits" of following rules printed in the Federal
Register may be far more illusory and surely fewer.
The implementation of benefit/ cost analyses needs a great deal
of attention. After all, a reluctant agency can merely go through the
motions of studying the effects of its actions on the economy and
then proceed as it originally intended. An agency not directly
involved in regulation -such as the General Accounting Office or the
Office of Management and Budget-should set government-wide
standards, concepts, and methods of performing economic
evaluations of regulations, including the estimation of benefits and
costs. The determination of the interest rates to be used in
discounting future costs and benefits, for example, should not be a
matter left to the judgment of the agency which is attempting to
justify its own action. Where a dollar sign cannot be placed on the
benefits, reliance can be placed on cost/ effectiveness analysis, which
is a search for least-cost solutions.
As a minimum, the Congress should endorse the kind of
common sense that was embodied in a federal court decision which
stopped OSHA from issuing new benzene regulations. The court's
language is instructive: ''Although the agency does not have to
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conduct an elaborate cost/benefit analysis ... it does have to
determine whether the benefits expected from the standards bear a
reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the standard." 16
(When OSHA appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, its
benzene standards were rejected.)
The ability of the executive branch to change the basic
regulatory system is limited. Each regulation is issued in accord with
a law passed by Congress. Reform measures cannot simply be
"proclaimed," they must be legislated. Many of the proposals to
reform government regulation involve the "sunset" mechanism-the
compulsory periodic review of each major regulatory program to
determine whether it is worthwhile to continue it in the light of
changing circumstances. This procedure would provide Congress with
a formal opportunity to revise the underlying regulatory statutes or
to determine that a given regulatory program is no longer needed and
that the "sun" should be allowed to "set" on it. A benefit/ cost
analysis would provide a quantitative mechanism that would help in
making those value judgments.
Budgeting as a Management Tool

Greater attention should be given to the role of the Congressional budget process in managing regulation. In those cases where an
agency's regulations generate more costs than benefits, the agency's
budget for the coming year should be reduced, and perhaps vice versa.
Because the appropriations for the regulatory agencies are small
portions of the government's total budget, limited attention has been
given to them in the budget process. In view of the large costs that they
often impose on the society as a whole, greater attention is warranted in
reviewing their appropriation requests via a regulatory budget.
Changing Attitudes Toward Regulation

Fundamentally, regulatory reform is not a concern with technical
measurements or administrative procedures. Rather, government
decision makers need to take a very different view of the regulatory
mechanism than they do now. Rather than relying on regulation to
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control in detail every facet of private behavior, the regulatory device
needs to be seen as a powerful tool to be used reluctantly and with
great care and discretion. Consequently, it is attitudes that need to be
changed. Experience with the job safety program provides a cogent
example. Although the government's safety rules have resulted in
billions of dollars in public and private outlays, the goal of a safer
work environment has not been achieved.
A more satisfying answer to improving the effectiveness of
government regulation of private activities requires a major change in
the approach taken to regulation, and one not limited to the job
safety program. Indeed, that program is used here merely as an
illustration. If the objective of public policy is to reduce accidents,
then public policy should focus directly on the reduction of accidents.
Excessively detailed regulations are often merely a substitute-the
normal bureaucratic substitute-for hard policy decisions.
Rather than placing emphasis on issuing citations to employers
who fail to fill forms out correctly or who do not post the required
notices, stress should be placed on the regulation of those employers
with high and rising accident rates. Perhaps fines should be levied on
those establishments with the worst safety records. As the accident
rates decline toward some sensible standard, the fines could be
reduced or eliminated. But the government should not be much
concerned with the way a specific organization achieves a safer
working environment. Some companies may find it more efficient to
change work rules, others to buy new equipment, and still others to
retrain workers. The making of this choice is precisely the kind of
operational business decision making that government should avoid,
but that now dominates many regulatory programs.

The promulgation by government of rules and regulations
restricting or prescribing private activity is not, of course, the only
means of accomplishing public objectives. Codes of behavior adhered
to on a voluntary basis can be effective. Government itself has
available to it various powers other than the regulatory mechanism.

Through its taxing authority, the government can provide strong
signals to the market. Rather than promulgating detailed regulations
governing allowable discharges into the nation's waterways, the
government could levy substantial taxes on those discharges.
The use of taxation would be meant neither to punish polluters
nor to give them a "license" to pollute. Rather, it would work
through the price system to encourage producers and consumers to
shift to less polluting ways of producing and consuming goods and
services. Price incentives tend to force the environmental agencies to
consider explicitly the cost of cleaning up pollution, while direct
controls make it very easy to adopt extremely expensive if not
unrealistic goals, such as zero discharge.
In the case of the traditional, one-industry type of government
regulation (as of airlines, trucking, and railroads), a greater role
should be given to the competitive process and to market forces.
Unlike the newer forms of regulation, the older forms of regulation
are often mainly barriers to entry into a given industry, protecting
existing firms from competition by potential new entrants. To date,
none of the procedural reforms previously described has been
enacted by the Congress. Perhaps the most significant single legislative action in the regulatory reform area in recent years was the law
phasing out the Civil Aeronautics Board over a seven year period.
With reference to consumer protection, an information strategy
can provide a sensible alternative to compulsory product standards.
For the many visible hazards that consumers voluntarily subject
themselves to, the most important consideration in public policy is to
improve the individual's knowledge of the risks involved rather than
limit personal discretion. In their daily lives, citizens rarely opt for
zero-risk alternatives and more often trade off between speed and
safety, for example.
The more widespread provision of information to consumers on
potential hazards in various products may, in many circumstances, be
far more effective than banning specific products or setting standards
requiring expensive alterations in existing products. The information
approach takes account of the great variety of consumer desires and
capabilities. Interestingly enough, this approach often is favored in
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consumer surveys, although not by some of the most vehement
representatives of the so-called public interest groups.
Any realistic appraisal of government regulation must
acknowledge that important and positive benefits have resulted from
many of the regulatory activities-less pollution, fewer product
hazards, reducing job discrimination, and other socially desirable
goals of our society. But the "externalities" generated by federal
regulation do not justify government attempting to regulate every
facet of private behavior. A reasonable approach to this problem
requires great discrimination in sorting out the hazards that are
important to regulate from the kinds of lesser hazards that can best
be dealt with through the normal prudence of consumers, workers,
and business firmS. 17

Thus, the measurable dollar savings from regulatory reform
surely could be substantial. But, in the long run, the most important
benefits from changing the status quo would be the improved
productivity, the higher rates of capital formation and innovation,
and ultimately the improved living standards that would result for
American consumers. That surely makes regulatory reform a worthy
and high-priority undertaking.

THE SAVINGS FROM REGULATORY REFORM
It is difficult to estimate the specific savings that would occur
from the adoption of any of the approaches to regulatory reform
suggested here. What is clear, however, is that each of these changes
could reduce the economic burden of government rule-making while
often increasing the likelihood of reaching the nation's basic goals
and objectives. This is most apparent in the case of economic
regulation, where the reliance on competition would be a far less
costly way of meeting the public's transportation demands than the
status quo of detailed regulation.
On the basis of the data in Table 4, savings in the area of
economic regulation-by deregulating the airline, railroad, trucking,
radio and television industries-could well reach $20 billion a year.
In the field of social regulation, a reasonable initial objective would
be to slow down, if not halt, the now rapid rise in the issuance-and
thus the cost of complying with-new rules and directives. As
pointed out earlier, one major new OSHA standard alone may likely
generate a larger economic burden of compliance than the entire
array of existing rules issued by that agency, which imposes costs of
over $3 billion a year at present. Moreover, the potential cost of new
environmental regulations already in the ''pipeline'' is far greater.
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